Determinism is frequently understood as implying the possibility of perfect prediction. This possibility then functions as an assumption in the Manipulation Argument for the incompatibility of free will and determinism. Yet this assumption is mistaken. As a result, arguments that rely on it fail to show that determinism would rule out human free will. We explain why determinism does not imply the possibility of perfect prediction in any world with laws of nature like ours, since it would be impossible for an agent to predict with certainty any future event that is causally influenced by events outside her own backward light cone yet inside the backward light cone of the future event. This is the light-cone limit and it undermines the Manipulation Argument or limits what this argument can tell us about the relevance of determinism to free will. We also respond to objections that the light-cone limit is irrelevant to the Manipulation Argument.

决定论经常被理解为暗示完美预测的可能性。然后，这种可能性作为操纵论证中关于自由意志和决定论不相容的假设发挥作用。然而这个假设是错误的。结果，依赖它的论点未能表明决定论会排除人类的自由意志。我们解释了为什么决定论并不意味着在任何具有像我们这样的自然法则的世界中完美预测的可能性，因为代理不可能确定地预测任何受其自身后向光锥之外的事件因果影响的未来事件在未来事件的后向光锥内。这是光锥极限它破坏了操纵论点或限制了这个论点可以告诉我们关于决定论与自由意志的相关性。我们还回应了光锥限制与操纵论点无关的反对意见。