The argument I defend in this paper challenges whether Waldron’s explanation of the conditions required for a moral right to satisfy its autonomy-promoting function is the best one available. It questions the suitability of Waldron’s preferred taxonomy of moral action, where acts are divided into: (1) those that are morally required; (2) those that are morally prohibited; and (3) those that are morally indifferent, advocating instead for a binary classification consisting of: (a) actions that admit of reasonable moral disagreement; and (b) actions that do not admit of reasonable moral disagreement. My claim is that the protective sphere moral rights set up in organizing the moral relations among persons is applicable only to the former category—namely, actions that admit of reasonable moral disagreement. Actions that do not admit of reasonable moral disagreement will either: (b’) not normally demand a right against interference in the first place (if the action is unquestionably permissible); or (b”) fail to admit of a right against interference at all (if the action is unquestionably impermissible). This competing explanation allows us to preserve the autonomy-promoting conception of moral rights Waldron endorses while avoiding a number of its suspect implications.

我在本文中辩护的论点质疑沃尔德伦对道德权利满足其自主促进功能所需条件的解释是否是最好的解释。它质疑沃尔德伦首选的道德行为分类法的适用性，其中行为分为：（1）道德要求的行为；（二）道德上禁止的；(3) 那些在道德上漠不关心的人，而是提倡二元分类，包括： (a) 承认合理的道德分歧的行为；(b) 不承认合理的道德分歧的行为。我的主张是，在组织人与人之间的道德关系时所建立的保护范围的道德权利仅适用于前一类——即承认合理的道德分歧的行为。不承认合理道德分歧的行为将： (b') 通常不首先要求反对干涉的权利（如果该行为无疑是允许的）；或 (b”) 根本不承认反对干涉的权利（如果该行为无疑是不允许的）。这种相互竞争的解释使我们能够保留沃尔德伦所认可的促进自治的道德权利概念，同时避免其一些可疑的含义。