ABSTRACT

Stefansson (forthcoming) argues that by emitting and offsetting, we fail to fulfil our justice-based duty to avoid harm owed to specific individuals. In this paper, I explore a case where offsetting fails to prevent some but not all risks of harms that our emissions impose on them. By drawing on a distinction between general and specific duties not to (risk) harm, I argue that if by emitting and offsetting, we satisfy some (if not all) of our specific duties we owe others, then this gives us stronger moral reasons to offset than give to charities that do good more effectively.

中文翻译：

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为什么我仍然应该抵消而不是做得更好

摘要

Stefansson（即将出版）认为，通过排放和抵消，我们未能履行我们基于正义的义务，以避免对特定个人造成伤害。在本文中，我探讨了一个案例，即抵消未能防止我们的排放对他们造成的一些但不是全部的危害风险。通过区分不（风险）伤害的一般义务和具体义务，我认为，如果通过排放和抵消，我们履行了我们欠其他人的一些（如果不是全部）具体义务，那么这给了我们更有力的道德理由来抵消而不是捐赠给更有效地做好事的慈善机构。