ABSTRACT

In ‘Should I offset or should I do more good?’, H. Orri Stefansson defends an argument that calls into question the belief that we can discharge our duties to prevent harm by carbon offsetting. Stefansson suggests that other actions, such as donations, should be preferred. This paper questions aspects of that analysis by evaluating the normative assumptions underlying it. It does so from a broadly Kantian perspective. I begin by highlighting assumptions that could benefit from elaboration and defense. These concern justice, anthropocentrism, imputability, and temporal perspectives. Lastly, I consider Kant’s long-term view of humanity to supplement any short-termist limitations.

摘要

在“我应该抵消还是应该做得更多？”中，H. Orri Stefansson 捍卫了一个论点，该论点质疑我们可以履行职责以防止碳抵消造成伤害的信念。Stefansson 建议应该优先采取其他行动，例如捐赠。本文通过评估其背后的规范假设来质疑该分析的各个方面。它是从广义的康德式的角度来看的。我首先强调可以从阐述和辩护中受益的假设。这些涉及正义、人类中心主义、归责性和时间观点。最后，我认为康德的长期人性观是对任何短期主义局限性的补充。