In line with a wider expansion of global governance tools to prevent and punish corruption, the enforcement of anti-foreign bribery laws is increasing. Yet few cases are tested in court; rather, confidential negotiations and out-of-court settlements have become the norm. Many argue that this favours the enforcement authorities, since even firms with a good defence are reluctant to risk a trial when settlement appears a safer option, but there is very little evidence about what really happens in anti-foreign bribery negotiations and how companies and enforcement authorities interact during this process. Through qualitative research with participants in negotiations for settlements of the United States Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and the United Kingdom Bribery Act, we find evidence that companies have considerable power to influence how the law is interpreted and implemented. In particular, companies use compliance programs to signal good character, while enforcement authorities willingly accept these symbols as justification for settling out of court or acting leniently. Companies therefore play a key role in shaping the law in places where it is ambiguous, an interesting example of ‘legal endogeneity’, whereby the subjects of the law help to shape its meaning.

随着全球治理工具在预防和惩治腐败方面的广泛扩展，反外国贿赂法的执法力度也在增加。然而，很少有案件经过法庭审理；相反，秘密谈判和庭外和解已成为常态。许多人认为这有利于执法当局，因为即使是具有良好辩护的公司也不愿冒险在和解似乎是更安全的选择时进行审判，但很少有证据表明反外国贿赂谈判中真正发生了什么以及公司和执法如何当局在此过程中相互影响。通过与美国《反海外腐败法》和《英国反贿赂法》和解谈判的参与者进行定性研究，我们发现有证据表明公司拥有相当大的权力来影响法律的解释和实施方式。特别是，公司使用合规计划来表明良好的品格，而执法当局则愿意接受这些符号作为庭外和解或宽大处理的理由。因此，在法律模棱两可的地方，公司在塑造法律方面发挥着关键作用，这是“法律内生性”的一个有趣例子，法律主体有助于塑造其含义。