Perceptual beliefs that categorize objects can be justified by demonstrating basic properties (eg shapes) of the objects. In these justifications, perceptual justifiers have different contents to the beliefs they justify. I argue that the justifications are not inferential. Subjects are unlikely to have bodies of beliefs adequate to inferentially justify the beliefs they actually form on the strength of their object recognition abilities, especially when recognition depends on stimulus-dependent retrieval of visual memories. Instead, I argue, the justifications exploit a partial awareness that subjects have of states and processes involved in object recognition. As such, they show that subjects have a degree of internal access to the principles of externalistic perceptual warrant, and to the features of perceptual states that give them justificatory force on externalistic accounts. The justifications themselves are evidential, but in order for them to have any justificatory force, they have to be placed in an externalistic framework for perceptual justification. I conclude that this form of justification shows that subjects have a degree of insight into why their perceptual experiences justify their beliefs.

可以通过展示对象的基本属性（例如形状）来证明对对象进行分类的感知信念是正确的。在这些证明中，感性证明者与他们证明的信念具有不同的内容。我认为这些理由不是推论的。受试者不太可能拥有足以根据其对象识别能力的强度来推理证明他们实际形成的信念的信念，特别是当识别依赖于视觉记忆的刺激依赖性检索时。相反，我认为，这些理由利用了主体对物体识别所涉及的状态和过程的部分意识。因此，他们表明，受试者在一定程度上可以从内部获得外部感知保证的原则，以及感知状态的特征，这些特征赋予它们在外部主义账户上的正当性力量。证明本身是证据性的，但为了使它们具有任何证明力，它们必须被置于感性证明的外部框架中。我的结论是，这种证明形式表明受试者对为什么他们的感知经验证明他们的信念有一定程度的洞察力。