In recent years, two competing methodological frameworks have developed in the study of the epistemology of philosophy. The traditional camp, led by experimental philosophy and its allies, has made inferences about the epistemology of philosophy based on the reactions, or intuitions, people have to works of philosophy. In contrast, multiple authors have followed the lead of Deutsch and Cappelen by setting aside experimental data in favor of inferences based on careful examination of the text of notable works of philosophy. In other words, the debate is split between authors focusing on philosophy’s consumption and those focusing on philosophy’s production. This paper examines the motivation for focusing on original texts and other evidence of philosophy’s production and finds it lacking. Drawing upon Hills’ distinction between propagation and transmission, I argue that the social epistemology of philosophy does not justify the recent focus on original texts of philosophy. Because the philosophical knowledge of consumers of philosophy is likely inspired by producers of philosophy, as opposed to epistemically grounded in the producers’ epistemic states, experimental philosophy had it right all along—if we want to know the epistemic standing of philosophy, we need to look to philosophy’s consumers.

近年来，在哲学认识论的研究中出现了两种相互竞争的方法论框架。以实验哲学及其盟友为首的传统阵营，根据人们对哲学作品的反应或直觉，对哲学认识论做出了推论。相比之下，多位作者效仿多伊奇和卡佩伦的做法，搁置实验数据，支持基于对著名哲学著作文本的仔细研究的推论。换言之，争论分为关注哲学消费的作者和关注哲学生产的作者。. 本文考察了关注原始文本和哲学产生的其他证据的动机，并发现其缺乏。借鉴希尔斯对传播和传播的区分，我认为哲学的社会认识论并不能证明最近对哲学原始文本的关注是正确的。因为哲学消费者的哲学知识很可能受到哲学生产者的启发，而不是基于生产者的认识状态，实验哲学一直都是正确的——如果我们想知道哲学的认识立场，我们需要看哲学的消费者。