Using rich plant-level data, we analyze the relative performance of firms with inside and outside CEOs. We show that firms with outside CEOs achieve greater productivity improvements compared to firms with inside CEOs. Contrary to conventional wisdom, the relation is stronger in well-performing, rather than poorly performing, firms. Although part of the productivity growth differential comes from divesting low-performing, peripheral, low-tech, and unionized plants, most productivity improvements arise from streamlining continuing plants. Here, productivity is increased by consolidating products, changing the composition of investments toward newer capital, shifting to more capital-intensive production, adopting structured management practices, and improving labor productivity.

利用丰富的工厂级数据，我们分析了拥有内部和外部 CEO 的公司的相对绩效。我们表明，与拥有内部 CEO 的公司相比，拥有外部 CEO 的公司实现了更大的生产力提升。与传统观点相反，这种关系在表现良好的公司中更强，而不是在表现不佳的公司中。尽管生产力增长差异的一部分来自于剥离低绩效、外围、低技术和工会化工厂，但大多数生产力提高来自精简连续工厂。在这里，通过整合产品、改变投资构成以更新资本、转向资本密集型生产、采用结构化管理实践和提高劳动生产率来提高生产率。