I examine whether corporate managers learn from institutional investors through direct interactions at investor conferences. I find that managers seek more direct interactions with institutional investors at conferences when they have a greater need for information about their firm's product markets and supply chains. This relation is stronger when managers expect investors to be knowledgeable. I also show that the information acquired from conference interactions is reflected in subsequent manager decisions. First, direct interactions help managers to extract information embedded in stock prices and later use it to make investments. Second, within the same firm and month, managers' personal stock trades immediately after attending a conference earn higher abnormal returns, consistent with direct interactions expanding their private information set. Overall, these findings suggest that managers can acquire decision-relevant information from direct interactions with institutional investors of their firm.

我研究了公司经理是否通过在投资者会议上的直接互动向机构投资者学习。我发现，当管理者更需要有关其公司产品市场和供应链的信息时，他们会在会议上寻求与机构投资者进行更直接的互动。当管理者期望投资者知识渊博时，这种关系会更强。我还表明，从会议互动中获得的信息会反映在随后的经理决策中。首先，直接互动帮助管理者提取股票价格中包含的信息，然后用它来进行投资。其次，在同一公司和月份内，经理人在参加会议后立即进行的个人股票交易获得了更高的异常收益，与扩大他们的私人信息集的直接互动一致。总的来说，这些发现表明，管理者可以从与公司机构投资者的直接互动中获取与决策相关的信息。