Abstract

This article deals with the observation of the activities of West Germans in the Middle East by the West German intelligence organizations Org. Gehlen (under US tutelage until 1956) and the Bundesnachrichtendienst/ BND (under German Federal jurisdiction thereafter) between the late 1940s and late 1960s. It is largely based on hitherto unpublished primary sources from the BND archive, to which the author had access as member of the officially appointed Independent Commission of Historians for the History of the BND (‘Unabhängige Historikerkommission’ or UHK). It argues that the Org. Gehlen/ the BND performed well. It furnished its employers with accurate information and insightful interpretations in the complicated field of Middle Eastern politics in the first quarter century after de-colonization. It also demonstrates how the Federal Government did not necessarily follow the BND’s recommendations, particularly with regard to its policy towards Israel. In this aspect the BND serves as an example of the strengths and weaknesses of intelligence services per se.

摘要

本文涉及西德情报组织 Org. 对西德人在中东活动的观察。盖伦（Gehlen）（直到 1956 年一直受美国监管）和 Bundesnachrichtendienst/BND（此后受德国联邦管辖）在 20 世纪 40 年代末至 1960 年代末之间。它主要基于 BND 档案中迄今为止未发表的主要资料，作者作为正式任命的 BND 历史历史学家独立委员会（“Unabhängige Historikerkommission”或 UHK）的成员获得了这些资料。它认为组织。盖伦/德国联邦情报局表现良好。它为雇主提供了去殖民化后第一个四分之一世纪复杂的中东政治领域的准确信息和富有洞察力的解释。它还表明联邦政府不一定遵循德国联邦情报局的建议，特别是关于其对以色列的政策。在这方面，德国联邦情报局是情报部门本身优缺点的一个例子。