ABSTRACT

Extinction is a concept of rapidly growing importance, with the world currently in the sixth mass extinction event and a biodiversity crisis. However, the concept of extinction has itself received surprisingly little attention from philosophers. I will first argue that in practice there is no single unified concept of extinction, but instead that its usage divides between descriptive, epistemic, and declarative concepts. I will then consider the epistemic challenges that arise in ascertaining whether a species has gone extinct, and how these lead to serious limitations on responsibility and accountability for preventing extinctions. I will propose two conceptual engineering changes to our understanding of extinction. Firstly, to use twin epistemic concepts of extinction, corresponding to high and low epistemic demands. Secondly, to explicitly recognize that in many contexts extinction is a thick concept that contains an evaluative component, which therefore motivates explicit ethical considerations such as the use of precautionary principles.

摘要

灭绝是一个日益重要的概念，目前世界正处于第六次大规模灭绝事件和生物多样性危机中。然而，令人惊讶的是，灭绝的概念本身并没有受到哲学家的关注。我首先要论证的是，在实践中并没有一个统一的灭绝概念，而是它的用法在描述性、认识性和陈述性概念之间进行了划分。然后，我将考虑在确定一个物种是否已经灭绝时出现的认知挑战，以及这些挑战如何导致对防止灭绝的责任和问责制的严重限制。我将对我们对灭绝的理解提出两个概念工程上的改变。首先，使用灭绝的双重认知概念，对应高和低的认知需求。第二，