For a wide variety of claims against the government, the federal courthouse doors are closed to all but those brought by powerful, organized interests. This is because hundreds of laws—colloquially known as “channeling statutes”—require disaffected groups to contest government bodies directly in appellate courts that hear cases individually. In theory, these laws promise quick, consistent, and authoritative legal decisions in appellate courts. In fact, without class actions, government bodies avoid judicial review by selectively avoiding claims brought by some of the most vulnerable people in the administrative state—from veterans and immigrants to coal miners, laborers, and the disabled.

This Article proposes a novel solution: courts of appeals should hear class actions themselves. In so doing, courts high in the judicial hierarchy would continue to authoritatively decide important legal questions involving government institutions while ensuring groups of similar, unrepresented parties finally get their day in court. While appellate class actions might sound like a strange procedural innovation, appellate courts already have the power to do this. Relying on the All Writs Act, appellate courts long ago created ad hoc procedures modeled after class actions to respond to systemic government harm.

This Article is the first to examine nascent experiments with appellate class actions. It shows that, contrary to popular belief, appellate courts can hear class actions, and it explains why they should do so. In cases challenging systemic abuse, this power has become vital not only to level the playing field between the government and the governed but also to protect courts’ core functions in our separation of powers—to hear claims, interpret law, and grant meaningful relief. Without classwide judgments in such cases, courts risk ceding power to the executive branch to decide for itself when judicial decisions limit its own unlawful policies.

对于针对政府的各种各样的索赔，联邦法院的大门对所有人关闭，但那些由强大的、有组织的利益集团提出的除外。这是因为数以百计的法律——俗称“引导法规”——要求心怀不满的团体直接在单独审理案件的上诉法院与政府机构抗衡。从理论上讲，这些法律承诺在上诉法院做出快速、一致和权威的法律裁决。事实上，在没有集体诉讼的情况下，政府机构通过选择性地避免行政国家中一些最弱势群体（从退伍军人和移民到煤矿工人、劳工和残疾人）提出的索赔来避免司法审查。

本文提出了一种新颖的解决方案：上诉法院应自行审理集体诉讼。这样做，司法等级较高的法院将继续权威地决定涉及政府机构的重要法律问题，同时确保类似的、无代表的团体最终在法庭上得到他们的一天。虽然上诉集体诉讼听起来像是一种奇怪的程序创新，但上诉法院已经有权这样做。上诉法院很久以前就根据《全令法案》制定了以集体诉讼为蓝本的临时程序，以应对政府的系统性损害。

本文是第一篇研究上诉集体诉讼的新生实验。它表明，与普遍看法相反，上诉法院可以审理集体诉讼，并解释了为什么他们应该这样做。在挑战系统性滥用的案件中，这种权力不仅对于在政府和被统治者之间创造公平的竞争环境，而且对于保护法院在我们的权力分立中的核心职能——审理索赔、解释法律和给予有意义的救济都变得至关重要。在这种情况下，如果没有集体判决，当司法决定限制其自身的非法政策时，法院就有可能将权力让给行政部门自行决定。