Phenomenology presents itself not as an explanation or interpretation of phenomena but as a description of them. Describing experience means making its internal structure explicit, which, in phenomenology, is an eidetic structure.

The method of phenomenological explication or clarification is, however, by no means univocal. This paper aims to isolate the two fundamental ways in which phenomenological description is achieved. The first refers to a phenomenology of manifestation, based on the concept of determination or datum, which is realized in the phenomenological-static approach and, in particular, on the concept of extensive quality. The second refers to a phenomenology of disposition, based on the concept of tension or force – which is realized in the genetic approach as well as in Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of perception – and, in particular on the concept of intensive or forceful quality.

The analysis of the difference between the two approaches allows us to introduce the crucial distinction between digital and analogue dimensions within phenomenology.

现象学本身不是对现象的解释或解释，而是对它们的描述。描述经验意味着将其内部结构明确化，这在现象学中是一种本质结构。

然而，现象学解释或澄清的方法绝不是单一的。本文旨在分离实现现象学描述的两种基本方式。第一个是指表现的现象学，它基于规定或数据的概念，它在现象学静态方法中实现，特别是在广泛质量的概念上实现。第二个指的是倾向现象学，它基于张力或力量的概念——这在遗传学方法以及梅洛-庞蒂的感知现象学中实现——特别是基于密集或有力的品质概念。

对这两种方法之间差异的分析使我们能够在现象学中引入数字维度和模拟维度之间的关键区别。