This article investigates the possibility to question the difference between artificial and human intelligence by assuming that the latter can incorporate artificial, external components just as artificial intelligence can simulate human responses, and by exploring human embodiment in its technically and digitally augmented dimension. The idea that digital processes do not merely imply a detachment from the body, a dematerialization or disembodiment, is supported by many researchers, starting already from those who—back in the 1980s—reacted to cyberpunk narratives and their tendency to posit a new mind–body dualism. Yet, here I would like to frame this thesis not within the post-human context but in a phenomenological perspective, and in doing so I will employ specific conceptual tools. I will particularly (1) rely on Katherine Hayles’ distinction between incorporating and inscribing practices; (2) refer to Maturana and Varela’s notion of structural coupling; (3) analyze algorithmic thinking and its temporal structure.

本文研究了质疑人工智能和人类智能之间差异的可能性，假设后者可以像人工智能可以模拟人类反应一样包含人工的外部组件，并通过在技术和数字增强维度上探索人类的体现。许多研究人员都支持数字过程不仅仅意味着脱离身体、去物质化或脱离实体的想法，从那些在 1980 年代对赛博朋克叙事和他们设想新思想的倾向做出反应的人就已经开始了——身体二元论。然而，在这里，我想不是在后人类背景下而是在现象学的角度来构建这篇论文，在此过程中，我将使用特定的概念工具。我将特别（1）依赖凯瑟琳·海尔斯（Katherine Hayles）对结合实践和铭刻实践的区分；(2) 参考 Maturana 和 Varela 的结构耦合概念；(3)分析算法思维及其时序结构。