We analyze the strategic interaction between undercapitalized banks and a supervisor in a recovery and resolution framework in which early recapitalizations can prevent later disorderly failures. Capital forbearance emerges because reputational, political, economic and fiscal costs undermine supervisors’ commitment to publicly resolve the banks that miss the request to privately recover. Under a weaker resolution threat, banks’ incentives to recover are lower and supervisors may end up having to resolve more banks. When marginal resolution costs steeply increase with the scale of the intervention, private recovery actions become strategic complements, producing too-many-to-resolve equilibria with high forbearance and high systemic costs.

我们分析了资本不足的银行与监管机构在复苏和解决框架中的战略互动，在该框架中，早期的资本重组可以防止后来的无序失败。资本宽容的出现是因为声誉、政治、经济和财政成本削弱了监管者公开解决未能私下恢复要求的银行的承诺。在较弱的决议威胁下，银行复苏的动机较低，监管者最终可能不得不解决更多银行。当边际解决成本随着干预规模的增加而急剧增加时，私人恢复行动成为战略补充，从而产生具有高容忍度和高系统成本的“太多而无法解决”的均衡。