The phenomenon of organizations breaking laws and norms in the pursuit of strategic advantage has received substantial attention in recent years. Such transgressions generally elicit the intervention of social control agents seeking to curb deviant behavior and defend the status quo. In some cases, their efforts result in the deviant behavior being suppressed; in other occasions, however, organizational deviance can persist and even be accepted into the very system of rules that was initially challenged. In this paper, we advance a structured view of this process by formulating a theory of the social control of organizational deviance. Building upon the sociological literature, we classify forms of social control based on their cooperativeness and formality; additionally, we shed light on the outcomes of social control by illustrating the conditions under which they are likely to be more or less accommodative of deviant behavior, as well as more or less permanent. In so doing, we contribute to the scholarly understanding of the role of social control in organizational fields, as well as of the advantageousness of deviant behavior as a strategic option for organizations.

中文翻译：

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摆脱它（或不摆脱它）：组织偏差的社会控制

近年来，组织为谋取战略优势而违反法律规范的现象受到广泛关注。这种违法行为通常会引起社会控制机构的干预，以遏制越轨行为并捍卫现状。在某些情况下，他们的努力导致越轨行为被压制；然而，在其他情况下，组织偏差可能会持续存在，甚至会被最初受到挑战的规则体系所接受。在本文中，我们通过制定组织偏差的社会控制理论来推进这一过程的结构化观点。在社会学文献的基础上，我们根据合作性和形式对社会控制形式进行分类；此外，我们通过说明社会控制可能或多或少地适应越轨行为以及或多或少是永久性的条件来阐明社会控制的结果。通过这样做，我们有助于学术理解社会控制在组织领域中的作用，以及异常行为作为组织战略选择的优势。