We examine the relationship between credit rating levels and rating agency fees in a public finance market in which rating agencies earn lower fees and face higher disclosure requirements relative to corporate bond and structured finance markets. Controlling for variation in the complexity of credit analysis at the issue level, we find evidence that rating agency conflicts of interest distort credit ratings in the municipal bond market. Unexpectedly expensive ratings are more likely downgraded, and inexpensive ratings are more likely upgraded. The relationship between credit ratings and rating agency fees is driven by issuers who lose access to AAA insurance.

中文翻译：

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评级机构费用：为公共财政付费？

我们研究了公共金融市场中信用评级水平和评级机构费用之间的关系，在该市场中，评级机构相对于公司债券和结构性融资市场收取较低的费用并面临更高的披露要求。控制发行层面信用分析复杂性的变化，我们发现有证据表明评级机构的利益冲突会扭曲市政债券市场的信用评级。出乎意料地昂贵的评级更有可能被降级，而廉价的评级更有可能被升级。信用评级和评级机构费用之间的关系是由无法获得 AAA 保险的发行人驱动的。