This paper critically assesses the current debates in philosophy of science that focus on the concept of values. In these debates, it is often assumed that all relevant non-epistemic influences on scientific research can be described as values and, consequently, that science carries social legitimacy if the correct values play their proper role in research. I argue that values are not the only relevant non-epistemic influences on research: not unless our definition of values is so broad that it becomes unmanageable. Other factors also affect the authority and social legitimacy of science. I employ political theorist Iris Marion Young’s concepts of social perspectives, opinions and interests to attempt a differentiation of contextual influences relevant to scientific research. While problems arising from these influences may overlap, they often differ in important ways too. As a consequence, I argue that contextual influences cannot be managed jointly but require distinct and complementary strategies.

本文批判性地评估了当前科学哲学中关注价值概念的争论。在这些辩论中，人们通常假设所有对科学研究相关的非认知影响都可以描述为价值观，因此，如果正确的价值观在研究中发挥适当的作用，科学就具有社会合法性。我认为价值观不是对研究唯一相关的非认知影响：除非我们对价值观的定义过于宽泛以至于变得难以管理。其他因素也会影响科学的权威性和社会合法性。我采用政治理论家 Iris Marion Young 的社会观点、观点和利益概念来尝试区分与科学研究相关的背景影响。虽然这些影响引起的问题可能会重叠，但它们通常在重要方面也有所不同。因此，我认为不能共同管理环境影响，而需要不同且互补的策略。