In Suppose and Tell, Williamson makes a new case for the material conditional account. He tries to explain away apparently countervailing data by arguing that these have been misinterpreted because researchers have overlooked the role of heuristics in the processing of conditionals. Cases involving the receipt of apparently conflicting conditionals play an important dialectical role in Williamson’s book: they are supposed to provide evidence for the material conditional account as well as for the defeasibility of a key procedure underlying our everyday assessments of conditionals. We argue that they can serve neither of these purposes and that Williamson overestimates the reach of heuristics. We specifically challenge Williamson’s assumption that, in the kind of cases centrally at issue in his book, the recipient of conflicting conditionals will typically accept those at face value, even granting Williamson that conditionals can be freely passed among speakers under normal conditions of testimony.

在假设和告诉, Williamson 为物质条件帐户提出了一个新案例。他试图通过争辩说这些数据被误解了，因为研究人员忽视了启发式在条件句处理中的作用，从而试图解释明显相反的数据。涉及收到明显冲突的条件的案例在威廉姆森的书中扮演着重要的辩证角色：它们应该为物质条件说明以及我们日常评估条件的关键程序的可废止性提供证据。我们认为它们不能满足这两个目的，而且威廉姆森高估了启发式的范围。我们特别挑战威廉姆森的假设，即在他书中集中讨论的那种案例中，