We study the optimality of macroprudential policies in an environment where banks provide liquidity to firms. Informational frictions between banks can cause interbank market freezes, prompting firms to accumulate their own liquid assets. Liquidity hoarding by firms in turn reduces the demand for bank loans and bank profitability, makes interbank market freezes even more likely, and may ultimately trigger a self-fulfilling bad equilibrium. Such “liquidity panics” provide an additional rationale for liquidity requirements on banks, which alleviate frictions in the banking sector and, paradoxically, can increase aggregate investment. Instead, policies encouraging bank lending can have the opposite effect.

中文翻译：

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流动性恐慌的宏观审慎政策

我们研究了在银行为企业提供流动性的环境下宏观审慎政策的最优性。银行之间的信息摩擦会导致银行间市场冻结，促使企业积累自己的流动资产。企业囤积流动性反过来会降低对银行贷款的需求和银行的盈利能力，使银行间市场冻结的可能性更大，并最终可能引发自我实现的不良均衡。这种“流动性恐慌”为对银行的流动性要求提供了额外的理由，从而缓解了银行业的摩擦，但矛盾的是，它可以增加总投资。相反，鼓励银行放贷的政策可能会产生相反的效果。