All of us have personal ideals. We are committed to being good (enough) friends, parents, neighbors, teachers, citizens, human beings, and more. In this paper, I examine the thick and thin aspects of these ideals: (i) their substance (to internalize an ideal is to endorse a particular way of being) and (ii) their accountability to reason (to internalize an ideal is to assume that this is really a good way to be). In considering how these two aspects interact in the ideal of rational agency, I address two philosophical debates that are generally conducted in isolation of each other: (i) debates over the anti-ideal of normative “fetishism” and (ii) debates over whether acting for a reason is acting “under the guise of the good.” In the final two sections of the paper, I further explore the relations among the thick and the thin. I note the role that coherence constraints play in the process whereby our ideals gain determinacy. At the same time, I argue, our ideals constrain the possibility and desirability of coherence. This has implications for a third debate: the debate over the possibility of moral dilemmas.

中文翻译：

---

个人理想和理性代理理想1

我们每个人都有个人理想。我们致力于成为（足够好的）朋友、父母、邻居、老师、公民、人类等等。在本文中，我研究了这些理想的厚重和薄弱方面：（i）它们的实质（将理想内在化就是认可一种特定的存在方式）和（ii）它们对理性的责任（将理想内化就是假设这确实是一个好方法）。在考虑这两个方面如何在理性能动性的理想中相互作用时，我提出了两个通常彼此孤立进行的哲学辩论：（i）关于规范性“拜物教”的反理想的辩论和（ii）关于是否存在的辩论出于某种原因而行动就是“打着善行的幌子”。在本文的最后两节中，我进一步探讨了厚与薄之间的关系。我注意到一致性约束在我们的理想获得确定性的过程中所发挥的作用。与此同时，我认为，我们的理想限制了一致性的可能性和可取性。这对第三场辩论有影响：关于道德困境可能性的辩论。