We sometimes seem to face fundamental moral uncertainty, i.e., uncertainty about what is morally good or morally right that cannot be reduced to ordinary descriptive uncertainty. This phenomenon raises a puzzle for noncognitivism, according to which moral judgments are desire-like attitudes as opposed to belief-like attitudes. Can a state of moral uncertainty really be a noncognitive state? So far, noncognitivists have not been able to offer a completely satisfactory account. Here, we argue that noncognitivists should exploit the formal analogy between moral uncertainty and moral multi-objective decision problems. Our ‘multi-objective story’ enables noncognitivists to save our moral uncertainty thought and talk by explaining how the underlying phenomenon could be noncognitive.

中文翻译：

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道德不确定性、非认知主义和多目标故事

我们有时似乎面临着基本的道德不确定性，即关于什么是道德上好的或道德上正确的不确定性，不能简化为普通的描述性不确定性。这种现象给非认知主义提出了一个难题，根据非认知主义，道德判断是类似欲望的态度，而不是类似信仰的态度。道德不确定的状态真的可以是非认知状态吗？到目前为止，非认知主义者还无法提供完全令人满意的解释。在这里，我们认为非认知主义者应该利用道德不确定性和道德多目标决策问题之间的形式类比。我们的“多目标故事”使非认知主义者能够通过解释潜在现象如何成为非认知性来拯救我们的道德不确定性思想和谈话。