A duty of loyalty prohibits fiduciaries from appropriating business opportunities from their companies. Starting in 2000, Delaware, followed by several other states, allowed boards to waive their duty. We show that public firms covered by waiver laws invest less in R&D, produce fewer and less valuable patents, and exhibit abnormally high inventor departures. Remaining innovation activities contribute less to firm value, a fact confirmed by the market reaction when firms reveal their curtailed internal growth opportunities by announcing acquisitions. Consistent with the laws’ intent to provide contracting flexibility to emerging firms, we find evidence of positive impacts for small firms.

中文翻译：

---

不忠的经理人和股东的财富

忠诚义务禁止受托人从其公司挪用商业机会。从 2000 年开始，特拉华州和其他几个州都允许董事会免除其职责。我们表明，豁免法涵盖的上市公司在研发上的投资较少，产生的专利价值越来越少，并且发明人离职率异常高。剩余的创新活动对公司价值的贡献较小，当公司通过宣布收购来揭示其减少的内部增长机会时，市场反应证实了这一事实。与法律为新兴公司提供合同灵活性的意图一致，我们发现了对小公司产生积极影响的证据。