Almost all ceasefires experience violations, yet we know little about how such violations relate to the military and political aspirations of conflict parties. This article builds on ceasefire and bargaining literature to understand why ceasefire violations occur and how they relate to strategic decision-making processes. Building on these theoretical insights, it proposes a typology of four main types of ceasefire violations: strategic violations serve to strengthen the military advantage of a conflict party, retaliatory violations seek to ensure ceasefire compliance, spoiling violations aim to undermine the efforts of leaders, and localized violations are delinked from strategic decision-making processes. A case study of a major ceasefire violation in the Bangsamoro peace process illustrates how we may use informal Bayesian reasoning to empirically distinguish between these different types of violations. Treating ceasefire violations as part of wider military and political processes enables us to better understand the causal conditions under which ceasefire violations occur and identify strategic interests of different actors to carry out these violations. This helps explain the varied responses to ceasefire violations and sharpens our understanding of how to address them.

中文翻译：

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停火违规：它们发生的原因以及它们与战略决策过程的关系

几乎所有停火协议都遭到违反，但我们对此类违反行为与冲突各方的军事和政治愿望有何关联却知之甚少。本文以停火和谈判文献为基础，以了解为什么会发生违反停火以及它们与战略决策过程的关系。在这些理论见解的基础上，它提出了四种主要类型的违反停火的类型：战略违反旨在加强冲突方的军事优势，报复性违反旨在确保停火遵守，破坏性违反旨在破坏领导人的努力，以及局部违规行为与战略决策进程脱节。Bangsamoro 和平进程中的重大停火违规案例研究说明了我们如何使用非正式的贝叶斯推理从经验上区分这些不同类型的违规行为。将违反停火行为视为更广泛的军事和政治进程的一部分，使我们能够更好地了解违反停火行为的因果条件，并确定不同行为者实施这些违反行为的战略利益。这有助于解释对违反停火行为的不同反应，并加深我们对如何解决这些问题的理解。将违反停火行为视为更广泛的军事和政治进程的一部分，使我们能够更好地了解违反停火行为的因果条件，并确定不同行为者实施这些违反行为的战略利益。这有助于解释对违反停火行为的不同反应，并加深我们对如何解决这些问题的理解。将违反停火行为视为更广泛的军事和政治进程的一部分，使我们能够更好地了解违反停火行为的因果条件，并确定不同行为者实施这些违反行为的战略利益。这有助于解释对违反停火行为的不同反应，并加深我们对如何解决这些问题的理解。