Many philosophers tacitly accept the View: consciousness is necessary for being a welfare subject. That is, in order to be an eligible bearer of welfare goods and bads, an entity must be capable of phenomenal consciousness. However, this paper argues that, in the absence of a compelling rationale, we are not licensed to accept the View, because doing so amounts to fallacious reasoning in theorizing about welfare: insisting on the View when consciousness is not in fact important for welfare value in a systematic and significant way is objectionably “consciousist.” As a result, the View does not advance our understanding of the value of consciousness. The paper further diagnoses why we may be attracted to the View, and what we should accept instead.

中文翻译：

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意识与福利主观性

许多哲学家心照不宣地接受这样的观点：作为一个福利主体，意识是必要的。也就是说，为了成为福利善恶的合格承担者，一个实体必须具备现象意识。然而，本文认为，在缺乏令人信服的理由的情况下，我们无权接受这种观点，因为这样做相当于在福利理论中进行错误的推理：当意识实际上对福利价值并不重要时，坚持这种观点以系统和重要的方式是令人反感的“意识主义”。因此，这种观点并没有增进我们对意识价值的理解。这篇论文进一步诊断了为什么我们可能会被这种观点所吸引，以及我们应该接受什么。