Electric vehicles play a key role in the transition to an environmental-friendly transportation system and can meanwhile enhance the power system’s evolution to the smart grid. With the adoption of dynamic pricing and usage scheduling enabled by the smart grid equipment, a variety of smart charging strategies have been designed to make the most of flexibility contained in their considerable electricity demand, whereas less effort is devoted to users’ willingness to participate. In this paper, we model a noncooperative pricing game between two types of charging stations. One offers conventional fast charging and the other uses the electric vehicles’ onboard batteries to provide regulation service to the grid. With drivers’ risk attitudes and bounded rationality taken into consideration, we design a prospect theory-based decision model to calculate the proportion of users that would go for the regulation-providing charging option. The decision model of the customer base is a critical determinant of profitability and it enables two competitors to strategically set their prices that optimally balance between gaining in market share and growing in profit per client. We prove the existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium for the game proposed and compute the equilibrium prices in different circumstances with respect to market settings and user segments. A comprehensive analysis of the results gives insights into the key factors at play and provides the grid operators with indications of how to increase the penetration of electric vehicles in the ancillary service market.

电动汽车在向环境友好型交通系统转型中发挥着关键作用，同时可以促进电力系统向智能电网的演进。随着智能电网设备采用动态定价和使用调度，各种智能充电策略被设计出来，以充分利用其可观电力需求中包含的灵活性，而对用户参与意愿的投入较少。在本文中，我们模拟了两种充电站之间的非合作定价博弈。一种提供传统的快速充电，另一种使用电动汽车的车载电池为电网提供调节服务。考虑到驾驶员的风险态度和有限理性，我们设计了一个基于前景理论的决策模型来计算将选择提供监管的收费选项的用户比例。客户群的决策模型是盈利能力的关键决定因素，它使两个竞争者能够战略性地设定价格，从而在获得市场份额和增加每个客户的利润之间实现最佳平衡。我们证明了所提出游戏的纯策略纳什均衡的存在性，并根据市场设置和用户细分计算了不同情况下的均衡价格。对结果的全面分析可以深入了解发挥作用的关键因素，并为电网运营商提供如何提高电动汽车在辅助服务市场渗透率的指示。