Many people believe the morality of abortion stands or falls on the moral status of the fetus, with abortion opponents arguing fetuses are persons with a right to life. Judith Jarvis Thomson bypasses this debate, arguing that even if we assume fetuses have a right to life, this is not a right to use other people’s bodies. Recently Perry Hendricks attempts to bypass discussion of rights, assuming that if he can show that some people have a right to use other’s bodies, then we ought to restrict abortion (and perhaps compel organ donation, charity, etc.). Hendricks attempts to illustrate this by way of a Feinberg-style cabin case. I argue Hendricks’ restrictivist argument fails.

许多人认为堕胎的道德高低取决于胎儿的道德地位，反对堕胎的人认为胎儿是有生命权的人。朱迪思·贾维斯·汤姆森 (Judith Jarvis Thomson) 绕过这场辩论，认为即使我们假设胎儿​​有生命权，这也不是使用他人身体的权利。最近 Perry Hendricks 试图绕过权利的讨论，假设如果他能证明某些人有权使用他人的身体，那么我们就应该限制堕胎（或许还可以强制器官捐献、慈善等）。Hendricks 试图通过 Feinberg 风格的机舱案例来说明这一点。我认为亨德里克斯的限制主义论点是失败的。