Postcrisis bank regulations raised market-making costs for bank-affiliated dealers. We show that this can, somewhat surprisingly, improve overall investor welfare and reduce average transaction costs despite the increased cost of immediacy. Bank dealers in OTC markets optimize between two parallel trading mechanisms: market making and matchmaking. Bank regulations that increase market-making costs change the market structure by intensifying competitive pressure from nonbank dealers and incentivizing bank dealers to shift their business activities toward matchmaking. Thus, postcrisis bank regulations have the (unintended) benefit of replacing costly bank balance sheets with a more efficient form of financial intermediation.

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从做市到撮合：银行监管会损害市场流动性吗？

危机后的银行监管提高了银行附属交易商的做市成本。我们表明，尽管增加了即时性成本，但令人惊讶的是，这可以改善整体投资者福利并降低平均交易成本。场外交易市场的银行交易商在两种平行交易机制之间进行优化：做市和撮合。增加做市成本的银行法规通过加剧来自非银行交易商的竞争压力和激励银行交易商将其业务活动转向撮合来改变市场结构。因此，危机后的银行监管具有（意想不到的）好处，即用更有效的金融中介形式取代昂贵的银行资产负债表。