Cognitive radio (CR) is a novel intelligent technology which enables opportunistic access to temporarily unused licensed frequency bands. A key functionality of CR is to distribute free channels efficiently amongst Secondary Users (SUs) boosting spectrum usage to assist the escalating wireless applications world wide. In this context, this paper introduces a channel allocation mechanism which enables SUs (CR enabled unlicensed users) to dynamically access unused spectrum bands to fulfill their spectrum needs. We model the channel allocation problem as a sealed-bid single-sided auction which primarily aims at maximizing the overall spectrum utilization. Market based spectrum auctions in CR networks motivate licensed users to participate and lease their under utilized radio resources to gain monetary benefits. Sequential bidding is applied to this model for auctioning homogeneous channels, which reduces communication overhead. Bid submission takes into account two major CR constraints, namely, dynamics in spectrum opportunities and differences in channel availability time, which on incorporation provide disruption free data transmission to the SUs. We reduce resource wastage in this model by performing multiple auction rounds. Application of second price auction determines winning bidders and their respective payments to auctioneer. The design of our auction mechanism is supported with the proofs of truthfulness and individually rational properties. Furthermore, experimental results indicate that our model outperforms an existing auction method. Spectrum utilization values show 22 to 75% improvement in our model with changing number of SUs, and 23 to 93% improvement in our model with changing number of channels.

认知无线电 (CR) 是一种新颖的智能技术，它允许机会性地访问暂时未使用的许可频段。CR 的一个关键功能是在二级用户 (SU) 之间有效地分配免费信道，从而提高频谱使用率，以协助全球范围内不断升级的无线应用。在此背景下，本文介绍了一种信道分配机制，该机制使 SU（启用 CR 的未许可用户）能够动态访问未使用的频段以满足其频谱需求。我们将信道分配问题建模为密封投标单面拍卖，其主要目的是最大化整体频谱利用率。CR 网络中基于市场的频谱拍卖会激励许可用户参与并租用其未充分利用的无线电资源以获取金钱收益。顺序竞价应用于该模型以拍卖同质渠道，从而减少了通信开销。投标提交考虑了两个主要的 CR 限制，即频谱机会的动态和信道可用时间的差异，这些限制在合并后可向 SU 提供无中断的数据传输。我们通过执行多轮拍卖来减少此模型中的资源浪费。二次价格拍卖的应用决定了中标人及其各自向拍卖人的付款。我们的拍卖机制的设计得到了真实性证明和个人理性属性的支持。此外，实验结果表明我们的模型优于现有的拍卖方法。频谱利用率值显示，随着 SU 数量的变化，我们的模型提高了 22% 到 75%，