This study investigates the implementation of a Government of India mandate that requires firms to spend at least 2% of their profits on corporate social responsibility (CSR). The results show that qualifying firms that voluntarily engaged in CSR before the mandate reduce their CSR spending afterward. Despite increasing advertisement expenditure likely to offset the lost signaling value of voluntary CSR, stock prices and operating performance of former voluntary CSR spenders who qualify under the law decline. Our results suggest that regulatory intervention in CSR can both diminish its signaling value and lead to a reduction in voluntary CSR spending.

中文翻译：

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政府强制性是否会排挤自愿的企业社会责任？来自印度的证据

本研究调查了印度政府要求企业将至少 2% 的利润用于企业社会责任 (CSR) 的要求的实施情况。结果表明，在强制执行之前自愿参与企业社会责任的合格公司会在之后减少其企业社会责任支出。尽管广告支出的增加可能会抵消自愿企业社会责任失去的信号价值，但根据法律符合资格的前自愿企业社会责任支出者的股票价格和经营业绩下降。我们的结果表明，对企业社会责任的监管干预既可以降低其信号价值，又可以减少自愿性企业社会责任支出。