In this paper, I highlight the significance of practices of refutation in philosophical inquiry, that is, practices of showing that a claim, person or theory is wrong. I present and contrast two prominent approaches to philosophical refutation: refutation in ancient Greek dialectic (elenchus), in its Socratic variant as described in Plato’s dialogues, and as described in Aristotle’s logical texts; and the practice of providing counterexamples to putative definitions familiar from twentieth century analytic philosophy, focusing on the so-called Gettier problem. Moreover, I discuss Lakatos’ method of proofs and refutations, as it offers insightful observations on the dynamics between arguments, refutations, and counterexamples. Overall, I argue that dialectic, in particular in its Socratic variant, is especially suitable for the philosophical purpose of questioning the obvious, as it invites reflection on one’s own doxastic commitments and on the tensions and inconsistencies within one’s set of beliefs. By contrast, the counterexample-based approach to philosophical refutation can give rise to philosophical theorizing that is overly focused on hairsplitting disputes, thus becoming alienated from the relevant human experiences. Insofar as philosophical inquiry treads the fine line between questioning the obvious while still seeking to say something significant about human experiences, perhaps a certain amount of what Lakatos describes as ‘monster-barring’—a rejection of overly fanciful, artificial putative counterexamples—has its place in philosophical argumentation.

在这篇论文中，我强调了哲学探究中反驳实践的重要性，即证明一个主张、一个人或一个理论是错误的实践。我提出并对比了两种重要的哲学反驳方法：古希腊辩证法的反驳（elenchus)，在柏拉图的对话中以及在亚里士多德的逻辑文本中所描述的苏格拉底变体；以及为二十世纪分析哲学中熟悉的假定定义提供反例的做法，重点是所谓的盖蒂尔问题。此外，我还讨论了拉卡托斯的证明和反驳方法，因为它对论证、反驳和反例之间的动态提供了深刻的观察。总的来说，我认为辩证法，尤其是苏格拉底式的辩证法，特别适用于质疑显而易见的哲学目的，因为它引发了对一个人自己的信念承诺以及一个人的一套信念中的紧张和矛盾的反思。相比之下，基于反例的哲学反驳方法可能会导致哲学理论化过于关注吹毛求疵的争论，从而疏远相关的人类经验。就哲学探究在质疑显而易见的事物与仍试图说出关于人类经验的重要事物之间的微妙界限而言，也许一定程度上拉卡托斯所描述的“怪物禁止”——拒绝过于幻想的、人为的假定反例——有其自身的意义在哲学论证中占有一席之地。