This conceptual paper contributes to the critique of a body of literature that will be named ‘deliberative corporate governance’ by defending non-deliberative acts performed by stakeholders. It first argues that this literature introduces to the corporation a decision-making process where it does not belong, given the corporation's economic role. This leads to an ‘efficiency constraint’ on any attempt to justify deliberation – deliberative governance theorists must show that it is the most efficient and cost-effective way to address the issues that concern them. A real case example where deliberation would have been counter-productive in that regard will show that this is not the case. Building on this example, the paper uses the theory of democratic agonism to argue that non-deliberative acts should be part of governance. A sketch of managerial duties vis-à-vis such acts is attempted as well. The paper does not seek to reject deliberative corporate governance entirely, but rather to defend the importance of non-deliberative practices in addressing its theoretical concern. It makes a conceptual contribution to corporate governance theory, from which it draws practical implications for stakeholders-oriented management.

中文翻译：

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聊够了，罢工！公司治理中的商议与博弈

这篇概念性论文通过捍卫利益相关者实施的非审议行为，对将被命名为“审议公司治理”的一系列文献做出了贡献。它首先争辩说，鉴于公司的经济角色，该文献向公司介绍了一个不属于公司的决策过程。这导致对任何证明协商合理的尝试都存在“效率约束”——协商治理理论家必须表明，这是解决与他们有关的问题的最有效和最具成本效益的方法。一个真实的案例表明，在这方面，审议会适得其反。在此示例的基础上，本文使用民主竞争理论来论证非协商行为应该是治理的一部分。还尝试了对此类行为的管理职责的概述。本文并不试图完全拒绝协商的公司治理，而是捍卫非协商实践在解决其理论问题中的重要性。它对公司治理理论做出了概念上的贡献，并从中得出了以利益相关者为导向的管理的实际意义。