If Amelia utters ‘Brad ate a salad in 2005’ assertorically, and she is speaking literally and sincerely, then I can infer that Amelia believes that Brad ate a salad in 2005. This paper discusses what makes this kind of inference truth-preserving. According to the baseline picture, my inference is truth-preserving because, if Amelia is a competent speaker, she believes that the sentence she uttered means that Brad ate a salad in 2005; thus, if Amelia believes that that sentence is true, then she must believe that Brad ate a salad in 2005. I argue that this view is not correct; on pain of irrationality, normal speakers can’t have specific beliefs about the meaning of the sentences they utter. I propose a new account, relying on the view that epistemically responsible speakers utter sentences assertorically only if they believe all the propositions which they think those sentences might mean.

中文翻译：

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从话语到信仰的推论

如果 Amelia 断言地说“Brad 在 2005 年吃了沙拉”，而且她说的是字面意思和真诚，那么我可以推断 Amelia 相信 Brad 在 2005 年吃了沙拉。本文讨论了是什么让这种推理保持真实。根据基线图片，我的推断是保真的，因为如果 Amelia 是一个称职的演讲者，她认为她所说的这句话意味着布拉德在 2005 年吃了沙拉；因此，如果 Amelia 相信那句话是真的，那么她一定相信 Brad 在 2005 年吃了沙拉。我认为这种观点是不正确的；由于非理性的痛苦，正常的说话者不能对他们所说的句子的含义有具体的信念。我建议一个新帐户，