Dominant family control reduces Type I agency conflicts because of monitoring efficiencies, while increasing Type II agency conflicts because of the family’s voting power. Additionally, Type II agency conflicts could be exacerbated if the family agents managed the firm solely for the family’s benefit. The two different types of agency conflicts were examined in a sample of 499 public Indian family businesses during the years 2006 to 2015. Family-controlled and non-family-managed firms appeared to be optimally configured to minimize both types of agency conflicts. The absence of management control appeared to alleviate some of the dissipative agency conflict effects of dominant family ownership.

支配性家庭控制由于监督效率而减少了第一类代理冲突，而由于家庭的投票权而增加了第二类代理冲突。此外，如果家族代理人只为家族利益管理公司，则第二类代理冲突可能会加剧。在 2006 年至 2015 年期间，对 499 家印度公共家族企业的样本进行了两种不同类型的代理冲突研究。家族控制和非家族管理的公司似乎进行了最佳配置，以最大限度地减少两种类型的代理冲突。缺乏管理控制似乎减轻了占主导地位的家族所有权的一些耗散代理冲突效应。