This study theoretically examines the effect of common ownership on emission levels when firms can use environmental CSR as a commitment device to soften competition. Specifically, we investigate how common ownership (or the extent of cooperation in an industry) affects firms’ voluntary commitment to emission restrictions and emissions abatement activities in an oligopoly. The results show that common ownership reduces emissions by reducing output and may stimulate emissions abatement activities if the degree of common ownership is small. However, significant common ownership always reduces emissions abatement activities. Additionally, common ownership may or may not improve welfare, depending on the implicit carbon cost.

本研究从理论上检验了当企业可以使用环境 CSR 作为软化竞争的承诺工具时，共同所有权对排放水平的影响。具体来说，我们调查了共同所有权（或行业中的合作程度）如何影响公司在寡头垄断中对排放限制和减排活动的自愿承诺。结果表明，共同所有制通过减少产出来减少排放，如果共同所有制程度较小，可能会刺激减排活动。然而，重要的共同所有权总是会减少减排活动。此外，共同所有权可能会或可能不会改善福利，这取决于隐含的碳成本。