We study the effectiveness of shareholder engagement, that is, shareholders communicating their views to management. When shareholders and management have different beliefs, each shareholder engages more effectively when other shareholders engage as well. A limited shareholder base can thus prevent effective engagement. However, a limited shareholder base naturally arises under heterogeneous beliefs because investors who most disagree with management do not become shareholders. Passive funds, which own the firm regardless of their beliefs, can counteract these effects and improve engagement. When shareholders’ and management’s preferences are strongly misaligned, shareholders’ engagement decisions become substitutes and the role of ownership structure declines.

中文翻译：

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为管理层提供建议：股东参与理论

我们研究股东参与的有效性，即股东将他们的观点传达给管理层。当股东和管理层有不同的信念时，当其他股东也参与时，每个股东都会更有效地参与。因此，有限的股东基础可能会妨碍有效参与。然而，有限的股东基础自然会在不同的信念下产生，因为最不同意管理层的投资者不会成为股东。无论信仰如何，拥有公司的被动基金可以抵消这些影响并提高参与度。当股东和管理层的偏好严重不一致时，股东的参与决策就会成为替代品，所有权结构的作用就会下降。