The notion of comparative probability defined in Bayesian subjectivist theory stems from an intuitive idea that for a given pair of events, one event may be considered ‘more probable’ than the other. Yet it is conceivable that there are cases where it is indeterminate as to which event is more probable, due to, for example, lack of robust statistical information. I take it that these cases involve indeterminate comparative probabilities. This article provides a Savage-style decision-theoretic foundation for indeterminate comparative probabilities.

中文翻译：

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不完全偏好和不确定的比较概率

贝叶斯主观主义理论中定义的比较概率的概念源于一个直观的想法，即对于给定的一对事件，一个事件可能被认为比另一个事件“更有可能”。然而，可以想象，在某些情况下，由于缺乏可靠的统计信息等原因，哪个事件更有可能发生是不确定的。我认为这些案例涉及不确定的比较概率。本文为不确定的比较概率提供了 Savage 式的决策理论基础。