We examine the variable annuity market to study conflicts of interest and the effect of fiduciary duty in brokerage markets. Insurers typically pay brokers higher commissions for selling more expensive annuities. Our results indicate that sales are four times as sensitive to brokers’ interests as to investors’. To limit conflicts of interest, the Department of Labor proposed a rule in 2016 holding brokers to a fiduciary standard. We find that after the proposal, sales of high-expense products fell by 52% as sales became more sensitive to expenses. Based on our structural estimates, investor welfare improved overall.

中文翻译：

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利益冲突和受托责任的影响：来自可变年金的证据

我们研究了可变年金市场，以研究经纪市场中的利益冲突和信托责任的影响。保险公司通常会因出售更昂贵的年金而向经纪人支付更高的佣金。我们的结果表明，销售对经纪人利益的敏感性是投资者利益的四倍。为了限制利益冲突，劳工部在 2016 年提出了一项规则，要求经纪人遵守受托标准。我们发现，在提案之后，由于销售对费用变得更加敏感，高费用产品的销售额下降了 52%。根据我们的结构性估计，投资者福利总体上有所改善。