We examine the relation between plant-level predictive analytics use and centralization of authority for more than 25,000 manufacturing plants using proprietary US Census data. We focus on headquarters' authority over plants through delegation of decision-making and design of performance-based incentives. We find that increased predictive analytics use is associated with reduced delegation of decision-rights to local managers, increased centralization of control over data gathering and reduced plant managerial payrolls. In terms of incentives, predictive analytics use is associated with more accurate targets and tighter linkages between rewards to workers (performance-based bonuses, promotions and firings) and measured performance. Overall, our findings suggest that predictive analytics use is associated with increased centralization of authority in headquarters.

我们使用专有的美国人口普查数据检查了 25,000 多家制造工厂的工厂级预测分析使用与权力集中之间的关系。我们注重总部对工厂的授权，通过决策授权和绩效激励设计。我们发现，增加预测分析的使用与减少向本地管理人员授予决策权、增加对数据收集控制的集中化以及减少工厂管理人员工资有关。在激励方面，预测分析的使用与更准确的目标以及对员工的奖励（基于绩效的奖金、晋升和解雇）与衡量绩效之间更紧密的联系相关联。全面的，