Advocacy groups have responded to the lack of political solutions to some of the greatest problems we face—from climate change to armed conflicts—by lobbying for securities regulation that increases corporate transparency. They aim to incentivize corporations to address problems that lack other political solutions. I discuss what we can (and cannot) learn about the efficacy of reporting mandates from the findings in Darendeli et al. (2022) and related papers that stakeholders respond to greater availability of corporate social responsibility information. I support my arguments with evidence from mandatory conflict mineral disclosures—to date, the only related US securities regulation. Although stakeholder responses are likely necessary to incentivize changes in corporate behavior, they are insufficient to justify a mandate. A convincing justification must explain how reporting mandates lead to socially beneficial real effects, are best overseen by the Securities and Exchange Commission, and are less costly than alternative policy instruments. So far, proponents of reporting mandates have, at best, provided incomplete justifications. These circumstances are problematic given the current push for mandatory reporting related to issues such as climate change and workplace diversity.

倡导团体通过游说提高公司透明度的证券监管来应对我们面临的一些最大问题（从气候变化到武装冲突）缺乏政治解决方案。他们旨在激励企业解决缺乏其他政治解决方案的问题。我讨论了我们可以（和不能）从 Darendeli 等人的调查结果中了解报告任务的有效性。(2022) 和相关论文，利益相关者对企业社会责任信息的更多可用性做出回应。我用强制性冲突矿物披露的证据来支持我的论点——迄今为止，这是唯一相关的美国证券法规。尽管利益相关者的回应对于激励企业行为的改变可能是必要的，但它们不足以证明授权是合理的。一个令人信服的理由必须解释报告授权如何产生对社会有益的实际效果，最好由证券交易委员会监督，并且比其他政策工具成本更低。到目前为止，报告任务的支持者充其量只是提供了不完整的理由。鉴于当前推动与气候变化和工作场所多样性等问题相关的强制性报告，这些情况是有问题的。