Political and cultural polarisation are leading explanations for climate change denial and inactions as seen in the Cultural Cognition Thesis (CCT). In this view, individuals hold positions on contested issues to conform to their ideological groups: people ascribe to certain beliefs, not to express what they know but to show their group identity. We present a conceptual test of the CCT using high-quality cross-national data from 21 European countries, Russia, and Israel (total N = 44,378). Climate change concern was correlated with identification with the political left (rs = 0.04–0.13), egalitarianism (rs = 0.04–0.13) and communitarianism (rs = 0.01–0.07), but in a broad definition cultural cognition was a weak predictor of climate change beliefs (R² = 3.82%), policy preferences (R² = 2.09%), and actions (R² = 0.62%). Moreover, climate change polarisation was not greatest among the highly educated as predicted by the CCT. Education was positively associated with climate beliefs (rs = 0.07–0.17), irrespective of political affiliation. Non-linear regressions indicated little evidence that the CCT's predictions held better for more extreme ideological groups. These results suggest cultural cognition may not be central to thoughts about climate change in Europe.

正如文化认知论文 (CCT) 中所见，政治和文化两极分化是对气候变化否认和不作为的主要解释。在这种观点中，个人在有争议的问题上持有立场以符合他们的意识形态群体：人们赋予某些信仰，不是为了表达他们所知道的，而是为了表明他们的群体身份。我们使用来自 21 个欧洲国家、俄罗斯和以色列（总N  = 44,378）的高质量跨国数据对 CCT 进行概念测试。气候变化问题与政治左派（r s = 0.04-0.13）、平等主义（r s = 0.04-0.13）和社群主义（ rs = 0.01–0.07），但广义而言，文化认知是气候变化信念（R ²  = 3.82%）、政策偏好（R ²  = 2.09%）和行动（R ²  = 0.62%）的弱预测因子。此外，正如 CCT 预测的那样，在受过高等教育的人群中，气候变化的两极分化并不是最严重的。教育与气候信念呈正相关（r s = 0.07-0.17），与政治派别无关。非线性回归表明几乎没有证据表明 CCT 的预测更适用于更极端的意识形态群体。这些结果表明，文化认知可能不是欧洲气候变化思想的核心。