Target shareholders have the right to ask for a higher merger price if good news emerges after a merger agreement. This “appraisal right” varies with state law and was substantially strengthened in Delaware in 2007. I examine how target managers respond to changes in this right. If target managers represent target shareholders, the managers would be more likely to release good news, but I find they are more likely to withhold good news when appraisal rights are higher. This suggests agency problems and collusion on the part of target managers, and thus my paper adds to the larger literature that considers agency problems on the part of managers.

中文翻译：

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并购期间的评估权和公司信息披露

如果合并协议后出现利好消息，目标公司股东有权要求更高的合并价格。这种“评估权”因州法律而异，并于 2007 年在特拉华州得到显着加强。我研究了目标公司经理如何应对这种权利的变化。如果目标公司经理代表目标公司股东，经理人发布好消息的可能性更大，但我发现当评估权更高时，他们更有可能隐瞒好消息。这表明代理问题和目标管理者的共谋，因此我的论文增加了考虑管理者代理问题的更大的文献。