What effect do economic sanctions have on target governments’ response to citizen campaigns? We assert that sanctions as a signal of international support for campaigners alter the bargaining environment between a target state and the campaign in ways that will likely draw more support from citizens and defections from the ruling base. This will in turn incentivize target leaders to be more conciliatory toward domestic campaigns with maximalist goals, especially when such campaigns are nonviolent. Results from a time-series, cross-national data analysis indicate that sanctions, particularly when they are enforced by multiple senders or with high cost, are effective in increasing the success rate of nonviolent campaigns. Given the plethora of sanctions research that points to their inefficacy and adverse effects, we show that sanctions could be an effective tool to extract concessions from governments facing nonviolent campaigns.

经济制裁对目标政府对公民运动的反应有什么影响？我们断言，制裁作为对竞选者的国际支持的信号，改变了目标国家与竞选活动之间的谈判环境，可能会吸引更多公民的支持和来自执政基础的叛逃。这反过来将激励目标领导人对具有最高目标的国内运动更加和解，尤其是当此类运动是非暴力的时。时间序列、跨国数据分析的结果表明，制裁，特别是当制裁由多个发送者执行或成本高昂时，可有效提高非暴力运动的成功率。鉴于大量制裁研究表明其无效和不利影响，