This paper examines whether mandatory disclosure affects the extent to which firms learn from external market participants. Conventional wisdom suggests that mandatory disclosure should increase the total amount of information in financial markets. However, disclosure can also reduce investors' incentives to acquire and produce information. Using the JOBS Act to identify variations in disclosure requirements, this paper finds that firms with reduced disclosure requirements attract more informed investors and learn more from financial markets than those with stricter disclosure requirements. This learning is concentrated among firms that attract sophisticated investors, particularly those with industry expertise, and weakens once firms are forced to disclose more information. Overall, the results suggest that one benefit from regulators’ recent efforts to reduce U.S. firm disclosure requirements is an increase in firm learning.

本文考察了强制披露是否会影响企业向外部市场参与者学习的程度。传统观点认为，强制披露应该会增加金融市场的信息总量。然而，信息披露也会降低投资者获取和生产信息的积极性。本文使用 JOBS 法案来确定披露要求的变化，发现与披露要求更严格的公司相比，披露要求降低的公司会吸引更多知情投资者并从金融市场学到更多信息。这种学习集中在吸引经验丰富的投资者的公司中，尤其是那些具有行业专业知识的公司，一旦公司被迫披露更多信息，这种学习就会减弱。全面的，