This study examines the relationship between the degree of external social and environmental regulatory pressures and firms’ integration of corporate social responsibility (CSR) criteria into executive compensation contracts. Building on the notion that firms operate in settings in which external regulatory pressures and internal corporate governance conditions interact, we investigate how internal corporate governance mechanisms moderate the relationship between external regulatory pressures and adoption of CSR criteria in executive compensation contracts. The analysis of a worldwide, longitudinal sample of 2,328 firms listed in 37 countries during 2003 through 2015 reveals that the degree of regulatory pressure on firms to operate in socially and environmentally sound ways positively influences their adoption of CSR criteria in executive compensation contracts (i.e., conformity effect). Regulatory pressures evoke heterogeneous responses among firms within a country though, depending on their interaction in the corporate governance bundle. Corporate governance mechanisms have moderating effects: a greater degree of board independence strengthens the conformity effect, whereas blockholder ownership weakens it. This study advances understanding of how the corporate governance bundle of external regulatory pressures and internal corporate governance mechanisms affects the adoption of a relatively recent, important corporate governance practice in the boardroom.

本研究考察了外部社会和环境监管压力的程度与公司将企业社会责任 (CSR) 标准整合到高管薪酬合同中的关系。基于公司在外部监管压力和内部公司治理条件相互作用的环境中运营的概念，我们研究了内部公司治理机制如何调节外部监管压力与高管薪酬合同中采用企业社会责任标准之间的关系。对全球 2 个纵向样本的分析，2003 年至 2015 年期间在 37 个国家/地区上市的 328 家公司表明，公司以社会和环境无害方式运营的监管压力程度对其在高管薪酬合同中采用 CSR 标准产生了积极影响（即一致性效应）。然而，监管压力会在一个国家内的公司之间引起不同的反应，这取决于它们在公司治理捆绑中的相互作用。公司治理机制具有调节作用：更大程度的董事会独立性加强了从众效应，而大股东所有权则削弱了它。本研究加深了对外部监管压力和内部公司治理机制的公司治理捆绑如何影响采用相对较新的、