Numerous countries use information-based strategies to supplement or replace traditional environmental risk-control approaches. These strategies rest on the deterrence effect: Informed stakeholders, including media and investors, penalize polluters, which leads them to self-regulate, thereby reinforcing the mandatory regulation. To effectively tackle the increase in environmental problems, the deterrence effect requires stakeholders to be concerned about the environment and be prepared to significantly and increasingly punish polluting firms. This paper provides evidence of the extent and evolution of this stock market disciplinary effect following the disclosure of major environmental crises over 6 decades, using an event study approach. We use the market reaction following non-environmental crises to establish a benchmark against which we measure market reaction to environmental crises, and limit our sample to high-profile events likely to be immediately attributed to firms. Overall, the market reacts more negatively to environmental than to non-environmental crises. However, the wealth losses following environmental crises have not increased since the early 1960s. The deterrence effect has thus not amplified in the US over the last 6 decades, indicating that information-based approaches are probably insufficient at regulating the escalating environmental problems.

许多国家使用基于信息的战略来补充或替代传统的环境风险控制方法。这些策略依赖于威慑效应：知情的利益相关者，包括媒体和投资者，惩罚污染者，导致他们自我监管，从而加强强制性监管。为了有效应对日益增多的环境问题，威慑效应要求利益相关者关注环境，并准备好对污染企业进行大量和越来越多的惩罚。本文使用事件研究方法，提供了在 6 年重大环境危机披露后股票市场纪律效应的程度和演变的证据。我们使用非环境危机后的市场反应来建立衡量市场对环境危机反应的基准，并将我们的样本限制在可能立即归因于公司的引人注目的事件上。总体而言，市场对环境的反应比对非环境危机的反应更消极。然而，环境危机后的财富损失自 1960 年代初以来并未增加. 因此，在过去 6 年中，美国的威慑效应并未扩大，这表明基于信息的方法可能不足以调节不断升级的环境问题。