Constitutivism holds that an account of what a thing is yields those normative standards to which that thing is by nature subject. We articulate a minimal form of constitutivism that we call formal, non-epistemological constitutivism which diverges from orthodox versions of constitutivism in two main respects. First: whereas orthodox versions of constitutivism hold that those ethical norms to which people are by nature subject are sui generis because of their special capacity to motivate action and legitimate criticism, we argue that these features are compatible with treating these norms as of a piece with those ‘formal’ natural-historical norms which can be used to assess living things. Second: unlike orthodox versions of constitutivism, our version does not seek to use a non-normative account of that kind of being which we are as a means of identifying those normative claims to which we are are by nature subject. We then indicate how our position can afford us the resources to address some of the familiar difficulties that face cognitivism in ethics.

构成主义认为，对事物是什么的解释产生了该事物本质上服从的那些规范标准。我们阐明了构成主义的一种最小形式，我们称之为正式的、非认识论的构成主义这在两个主要方面与正统的构成主义版本不同。第一：虽然构成主义的正统版本认为人们天生服从的那些伦理规范是自成一格的，因为它们具有激发行动和合法批评的特殊能力，但我们认为这些特征与将这些规范视为一个整体是相容的那些可以用来评估生物的“正式的”自然历史规范。第二：与构成主义的正统版本不同，我们的版本并不寻求使用对我们所是的那种存在的非规范性解释，作为识别我们天生服从的那些规范性主张的手段。然后，我们指出我们的立场如何能够为我们提供资源来解决道德认知主义面临的一些熟悉的困难。