We set forth what one may call a “constitutional reading” in opposition to the traditional widespread “constructivist reading” of the object of cognition. In the light of the so-called one-object view reading of Transcendental idealism, the object of cognition is nothing but the object that exists in itself insofar as it appears to our cognitive apparatus. The object exists mind-independently, while our cognition of the same object must be mind-independent. The constructivist reading mistakes the epistemological problem of how we come to cognize mind-dependently that what we represent (“the constitutional view”) are mind-independent objects with the Berkelian ontological problem of how we construct objects out of an undifferentiated, unstructured manifold (the constructivist view) My diagnosis is as follows. The first reason is the traditional “two-worlds view” reading of Kant’s idealism: if we take what exists in itself and the object of cognition as distinct things, then we must conclude that the object of cognition is a mind-dependent construction. Constructivist readers mistake the mind-dependent nature of our human cognition of objects for the putative mind-dependent nature of the known object. The second reason is overintellectualization. Constructivist readers mistake the objectifying syntheses of the imagination, below the threshold of self-consciousness, for cognitive conceptual operations by means of which we cognize (erkennen) the objects of cognition, or so I shall argue.

我们提出了一种可以称为“宪法解读”的东西，以反对对认知对象的传统广泛的“建构主义解读”。根据先验唯心主义所谓的单一对象观的解读，认知的对象只不过是在我们的认知机器面前出现的自在存在的对象。对象独立于心而存在，而我们对同一对象的认知必须独立于心。建构主义的解读错误地将我们如何依赖于心智地认知我们所代表的东西（“宪法观点”）是与心智无关的对象这一认识论问题与伯克利的本体论问题相混淆。我们如何从未分化的、非结构化的流形中构造对象（建构主义观点） 我的诊断如下。第一个原因是对康德唯心主义的传统“二元世界观”解读：如果我们把自在存在的东西和认知对象视为不同的事物，那么我们就必须得出这样的结论：认知对象是一种依赖于心智的建构。建构主义读者将我们人类对物体认知的思维依赖性质误认为已知物体的假定思维依赖性质. 第二个原因是过度智能化。建构主义的读者将想象的客观化综合（低于自我意识的门槛）误认为是认知概念操作，我们通过这些操作认知（erkennen）认知对象，或者我将这么论证。