Both John Campbell and Quassim Cassam have argued that we perceptually experience objects as mind-independent (MI), purportedly solving a problem they refer to as “Berkeley’s Puzzle.” In this paper, I will consider the same topic from a Husserlian perspective. In particular, I will clarify the idea of MI and argue that there is, indeed, a sense in which we can perceptually experience objects as MI, while also making objections to Campbell’s and Cassam’s respective arguments to the same effect. In particular, I will argue that objects can be experienced as MI in the sense of the experience’s not being due to the malfunctioning of a perceptual organ, e.g., when one examines the ways in which the object displays itself, and gains confidence that there is, indeed, nothing the matter with one’s eyes. I will address the issue of MI from the perspective of Husserlian evidentialism, according to which perceptual content is conceived in terms of ways of perceptually exploring the object, thereby gaining evidence pertinent to the object and its properties, e.g., as when one takes a look at the object’s shape from a different angle, or scrutinizes its color in better lighting.

约翰·坎贝尔 (John Campbell) 和夸西姆·卡萨姆 (Quassim Cassam) 都认为，我们在感知上体验物体是独立于思维的 (MI)，据称解决了他们所说的“伯克利之谜”的问题。在本文中，我将从胡塞尔的角度考虑同一主题。特别是，我将澄清 MI 的概念，并认为确实存在某种意义上我们可以将对象感知为 MI，同时也对坎贝尔和卡萨姆各自的论点提出同样的反对意见。特别是，我认为，物体可以被体验为 MI，因为该体验不是由于感知器官的故障而引起的，例如，当一个人检查物体展示自身的方式时，并获得了存在的信心确实，用眼睛看没什么问题。我将从胡塞尔证据主义的角度来讨论 MI 问题，根据胡塞尔证据主义，感知内容是根据感知探索对象的方式来构思的，从而获得与对象及其属性相关的证据，例如，当一个人看一眼时从不同角度观察物体的形状，或在更好的照明下仔细观察其颜色。