Online recycling has been recognized as an efficient method to increase the recovery amount of waste electrical and electronic equipment (WEEE). However, due to lack of supply and demand coordination, the operational performance of the “Internet + recycling” model in WEEE is not ideal. Thus, the question of how to effectively balance the relationship among consumers, recyclers, and the government is of great importance for the establishment of the “Internet + recycling” model. This paper builds a dual-recycling channel reverse supply chain (RSC) decision model using the Stackelberg game model, and discusses the impact of consumer perception, efforts of online recycler, and government regulations on collection price, quantity, and profit. The findings show that increasing the consumer preference for the online recycling channel can enhance the WEEE recovery scale and the profit of the RSC, and the online recycler, through its efforts, can rectify the disadvantage of consumer preference for the online channel. Government subsidy regulation can promote the enthusiasm of consumers and enterprises for recycling. Moreover, reward-penalty regulation will disrupt the stability of forward supply chain, while the RSC is more coordinated. These findings provide valuable reference to increase the WEEE collection quantity and to promote the development of the “Internet + recycling” model.

在线回收已被公认为增加废弃电气电子设备（WEEE）回收量的有效方法。然而，由于供需缺乏协调，“互联网+回收”模式在WEEE中的运行效果并不理想。因此，如何有效平衡消费者、回收者和政府之间的关系，对于“互联网+回收”模式的建立具有重要意义。本文利用 Stackelberg 博弈模型构建了双回收渠道逆向供应链 (RSC) 决策模型，并讨论了消费者感知、在线回收商努力和政府法规对回收价格、数量和利润的影响。研究结果表明，增加消费者对在线回收渠道的偏好可以提高 WEEE 回收规模和 RSC 的利润，而在线回收商可以通过其努力纠正消费者偏好在线渠道的劣势。政府补贴调控可以提升消费者和企业回收利用的积极性。此外，奖惩监管会破坏正向供应链的稳定性，而 RSC 则更加协调。这些发现为增加WEEE收集量，推动“互联网+回收”模式的发展提供了有价值的参考。政府补贴调控可以提升消费者和企业回收利用的积极性。此外，奖惩监管会破坏正向供应链的稳定性，而 RSC 则更加协调。这些发现为增加WEEE收集量，推动“互联网+回收”模式的发展提供了有价值的参考。政府补贴调控可以提升消费者和企业回收利用的积极性。此外，奖惩监管会破坏正向供应链的稳定性，而 RSC 则更加协调。这些发现为增加WEEE收集量，推动“互联网+回收”模式的发展提供了有价值的参考。